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In recent years, neuroscience has provided 
detailed insight into the human brain’s inner 
workings. This gives promise to the 
development of drugs that will improve our 
ability to treat people with mental disorders 
(Andreasen, 2001; Stahl, 2002) and help 
people to overcome addiction to nicotine, 
alcohol and other drugs (Cami & Farre, 
2003; Koob, 2000; World Health 
Organization, 2004). Another, potentially 
less welcome, by-product of this research—
at least according to some critics—is 
‘neuroenhancement’. 
 
This term includes the use of drugs and 
other interventions to modify brain 
processes with the aim of enhancing 
memory, mood and attention in people who 
are not impaired by illness or disorder 
(Elliott, 2003; Kramer, 1993; Parens, 1998, 
2002). Because they fear that these 
products will find a welcoming and 
potentially huge market, some 
neuroscientists and ethicists have 
expressed concerns about the non-medical 
use of neuroscience research. Although 
many of these worries seem new, it is worth 
remembering that humans have used drugs 
to enhance their psychological functioning 
since our ancestors discovered the mind-
altering effects of plant-derived preparations. 
When discussing the ethical implications 
and potential pitfalls of neuroenhancement, 
we can therefore learn from the long history 
of human experience with psychoactive 
drugs. 
 
Critics of neurological interventions outside 
the medical setting, such as Francis 
Fukuyama (2002), Carl Elliott (2003) and the 
US President’s Council on Bioethics (2003), 
contend that neuroenhancement is already 
with us. They claim that there is widespread 
use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 
(SSRI) antidepressants such as Prozac to 
modify mood and personality in 
nondepressed people, and that the stimulant 
methylphenidate (Ritalin) is used widely to 
improve attention and school performance in 
normal children. Although most critics 
accept the legitimate use of these drugs to 
treat depression and attention disorders, 
they argue that the fuzziness of diagnostic 
criteria means that drugs are increasingly 
being used for enhancement purposes. 
These uses are harbingers, they predict, of 
even more extensive neuropharmacological 
augmentation of psychological functioning. 
 
And the next wave of drugs in the 
pharmaceutical industry pipelines will extend 
even further beyond mood and 
attentiveness. One obvious candidate, 
because of the increasing age of the ‘baby 
boomer’ generation, is memory. Drugs that 
are now being developed to treat memory 
loss in Alzheimer’s patients could also be 
used to enhance memory function in healthy 
people. In addition, given the huge potential 
market for memory enhancers, therapeutics 
may be developed specifically for this 
purpose (Farah et al, 2004). Other drugs 
might attenuate unpleasant and traumatic 
memories (President’s Council on Bioethics, 
2003) or enhance ‘executive function’—our 
ability to allocate our attention to difficult 
tasks in a sustained and efficient way (Farah 
et al, 2004; Hall, 2003). 
 
The possibility that these drugs are used for 
enhancement and not for treating disorders 
has raised a variety of ethical concerns. 
Some ethicists worry about the 
consequences both for individuals who use 
these technologies and for those who do not 
but who may nonetheless be affected 
indirectly. Proponents of deontology—the 
study of moral obligation—express even 
more fundamental objections. They are 
concerned about whether people who use 
these technologies can give truly informed 
consent to their use, what effects these 
technologies will have on our understanding 
of ‘human nature’ and ourselves as 
individuals, and how we as a society will 
deal with human performance that is 
enhanced by pharmaceuticals. 
 
First, there are good reasons to question the 
safety of neuroenhancement. In fact, the 
frequent occurrence of adverse reactions to 
many therapeutics provides ample evidence 
that medical interventions not only cure but 
also harm. This is acceptable when drugs 
are used to treat serious diseases, if the 
side effect is less serious than the illness or 
disability being treated. But the trade-off 
between side effects and improvements may 
be less clear if healthy people use 
pharmaceutical enhancements to improve 
their mental performance. In addition, it may 
also be difficult to measure these side 
effects, particularly if they affect mood or 
behaviour 
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or if they appear only after prolonged and 
extensive use. Some critics invoke the 
evolutionary argument that any gains in 
human ability that are achieved 
technologically will involve trade-offs with 
other capacities that are selected for by our 
ancestral environment: that is, optimizing 
some abilities will inevitably be at a cost to 
others and to our overall performance 
(Farah, 2002). Proponents of neurological 
enhancement concede that there may be 
adverse side effects, but argue that these 
can be identified early and managed by 
monitoring technologies and advising 
potential users of their risks (Caplan, 2002; 
Stock, 2002). 
 
Safety is understandably the focus of 
debate, but it may be just as difficult to 
assess efficacy. Placebo effects will 
probably complicate the assessment of 
enhancement technologies as they do the 
assessment of other therapeutics. Efficacy 
evaluations that are based on short-term 
studies may not be able to identify whether 
adaptations in the human brain to 
neuropharmaceutical enhancements will 
eventually diminish their effectiveness. 
These difficulties in assessing the efficacy 
and safety of neuroenhancement drugs and 
technologies undoubtedly mean that many 
questionable products with unproven claims 
will find their way to the market. Our 
experience with purported ‘natural’ forms of 
enhancement in the form of nutraceuticals, 
functional foods and dietary supplements 
shows that protecting consumers from new 
technologies with doubtful efficacy will be a 
challenge. But this is not an insurmountable 
hurdle if we apply an adapted form of the 
regulatory apparatus for pharmaceuticals to 
neurological enhancements (Farah et al, 
2004). 
 
Whereas customers are still free to choose 
whether or not to use dietary supplements, 
critics claim that the time may come when 
they are no longer free to reject 
neuroenhancement. In fact, a major concern 
is that the widespread use of enhancement 
technologies will raise the standards of what 
counts as ‘normal’ (Farah, 2002; Parens, 
2002). Unlimited and unregulated use could 
coerce unwilling citizens into using 
enhancement technologies to compete 
effectively for education and employment 
opportunities (Farah, 2002). Such a scenario 
is not too far-fetched; critics point to the 
increasing abuse of performance-enhancing 
drugs in elite sports and the use of 
stimulants by school-aged children 
(Fukuyama, 2002; President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2003). They are also concerned 
that widespread neuroenhancement could 
lead to further discrimination against the 
disabled and people who reject 
enhancement (Parens, 2002). So far, 
evidence for these claims is only anecdotal 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003), but 
the quality of public debate could certainly 
improve with more and better data on the 
prevalence of these phenomena and the 
effectiveness of social norms and 
regulations in ameliorating their effects. 
 
More speculatively, overtly coerced 
enhancement could occur in schools; for 
example, if underperforming children were 
pressured to undergo treatment or cognitive 
enhancement. The same could happen in 
the workplace, if employers made 
preparedness to be enhanced a requirement 
of employment, or in prisons if enhancement 
was seen as a remedy for poor cognitive 
performance. It remains to be seen how 
realistic these concerns are and whether 
existing anti-discrimination laws and other 
legislation would protect citizens from overt 
coercion. A commonly proposed remedy—to 
ban enhancement technologies 
completely—would replace one form of 
coercive control with another. Indeed, a ban 
is arguably much more coercive than any 
gently persuasive ‘bandwagon’ effects that 
may arise from widespread use of 
neuroenhancement: those who do not want 
to be enhanced could use criminal law to 
prevent others from doing so (Caplan, 
2002). Caplan (2002) also argues that if this 
line of reasoning was accepted in other 
areas of social policy, we would have to ban 
private schools, academic coaching for 
college entry exams and cosmetic surgery. 
 
Others have argued that the widespread use 
of enhancement technologies could amplify 
existing social inequalities because the high 
price of new technologies would prevent the 
poor from using them (Farah, 2002; 
Fukuyama, 2002; Parens, 2002). This 
argument prompts two related responses 
from the defenders of enhancement: first, 
they counter that it is more a criticism of 
existing social hierarchies than a compelling 
objection to enhancement per se (Caplan, 
2002, 2003); and second, they argue that 
the problem can be overcome by addressing 
inequities in access to the new technologies. 
For example, we could make all forms of 
enhancement freely available to everyone 
by publicly subsidizing their costs. Many 
developed societies do this with medical 
treatments, including those that are arguably 
forms of enhancement, such as in vitro 
fertilization and contraception (Parens, 
2002). Alternatively, we could leave it to the 
free market to provide affordable access to 
enhancement, as increased efficiency in the 
production and delivery of the technology 
under market competition reduce prices 
(Lachmann, 2001; Stock, 2002). 
 
There are also many less well-formulated 
objections that stem from a general unease 
about the use of neuropharmaceuticals to 
enhance human functioning. These often 
derive their language and arguments from 
Judaeo-Christian theological traditions, 
although they are not only confined to 
people who share this view, but also 
resonate with others (President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2003). Many of these arguments 
can be described as ‘moral intuitions’ (Haidt, 
2001)—strongly held but often unsupported 
convictions that neuroenhancement is 
somehow ‘contrary to human nature’. 
These concerns are mainly about the 
implications of neuroenhancement for our 
understanding of ‘human nature’, our 
concept of what is a ‘person’ and our sense 
of ‘personal identity’. Will people who 
undergo neuroenhancement remain fully 
human? In what sense will they still be 
themselves? Some opponents of 
neuroenhancement claim that human nature 
will change in ways that undermine the 
human liberty and equality of rights that 
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are necessary conditions for a free society 
(Fukuyama, 2002; President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2003). It is perhaps surprising 
then that many who embrace existing forms 
of enhancement—such as cosmetic surgery, 
dialect and accent correction, or the 
voluntary amputation of healthy limbs—use 
the language of identity to express their 
satisfaction with the results, arguing that 
they now feel “truly themselves”, that is, truly 
the person that they always wanted to be 
(Elliott, 2003). 
 
Another widely shared intuition is that it is 
morally wrong to use pharmacological 
shortcuts to achieve social goals. According 
to this view, enhanced functioning achieved 
by pharmacological means is ‘cheating’. 
This has been legislated into bans on 
performance-enhancing drugs in sports in 
many developed countries and 
internationally by the Olympic Committee 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). It 
remains to be seen whether this attitude will 
inform the predominant societal response to 
neuropharmaceutical enhancement of 
cognition, memory and mood. 
 
The ethical issues raised by 
neuroenhancement are often discussed as if 
they were completely novel, but humans 
have long appreciated the mindaltering 
effects of natural substances. Furthermore, 
many existing psychoactive drugs—such as 
alcohol, caffeine, nicotine, heroin, cocaine, 
cannabis and 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
(MDMA)—were first used for medical 
purposes, which then enabled others to test 
their use in improving mood and 
performance. Nicotine was initially 
introduced to Europe as a herbal remedy for 
a variety of illnesses before becoming 
popular as a social stimulant (Goodman, 
1994). Morphine was widely used as an 
analgesic and cocaine as a local anaesthetic 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries before both became popular for 
their euphoriant, relaxant and stimulant 
effects (Courtwright, 1982). Cannabis and 
the hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide 
(LSD) were also used for medicinal 
purposes before they were advocated in the 
1970s for ‘mind expansion’ (Stevens, 1987). 
More recently, young adults have been 
using MDMA or ‘ecstasy’—originally 
developed as an adjunct to psychotherapy—
as a social facilitator and dance party 
energizer (Cohen, 1998). 
 
Our experiences with these psychoactive 
drugs enables us to make some broad 
predictions about the probable effects of 
newer forms of neuroenhancement on users 
and society, in the short and medium term. 
They might also serve as a helpful guide for 
assessing the effectiveness of regulations 
for these technologies, particularly the many 
attempts made over the past century to 
regulate the use of psychoactive substances 
through international treaties, legislation, 
regulation and criminal law (Courtwright, 
2001). The following hypotheses, drawn 
from historical experience with psychoactive 
drug use, provide a more detailed look at 
this analogy with existing drugs. 
 
First, the use of all psychoactive drugs 
entails risks to some users (Goldstein, 1994; 
Kleiman, 1992). These include acute effects 
at recommended doses, of which the 
adverse effects of medications are the most 
familiar. There is also the risk of overdosing 
and the adverse effects of chronic drug 
use—daily or near daily use of a drug over 
years or decades—which may take a long 
time to be discovered (Goldstein, 1994; Hall, 
1999). All of these effects depend on how 
these drugs are used and how many people 
use them. Particularly important here is the 
availability of neuropharmacological drugs to 
young adults, the more adventurous of 
whom are likely to use drugs for unapproved 
purposes in multiples of the recommended 
therapeutic dose (Kleiman, 1992). 
 
Second, we can clearly anticipate that the 
chronic use of neuropharmacological 
enhancers that affect mood, cognitive 
performance and personal well-being will 
lead to addiction (Goldstein, 1994; Kleiman, 
1992). This arises from the pharmacological 
misappropriation of neurological 
mechanisms that were selected for by 
evolution to reward behaviour required for 
individual and species survival, such as 
eating, drinking and copulating (Hill & 
Newlin, 2002). 
 
Third, the pattern of use of psychoactive 
substances among young adults often 
shows characteristics of an epidemic, with 
an initial dramatic rise in use that is often 
followed by an equally dramatic decline 
(Kleiman, 1992; Musto, 1999). Use and 
abuse tends to increase steeply during the 
early phase of ‘epidemic’ enthusiasm for a 
new drug: new users share their positive 
experiences with their peers and encourage 
them to try these drugs (Kleiman, 1992). If a 
drug has no serious acute adverse effects, it 
takes some time before long-term adverse 
effects are noticed, and even longer before 
information about these harms reaches 
current and potential users. When casualties 
eventually become apparent, drug 
enthusiasm declines steeply as the number 
of new recruits drops and existing users 
desist from using (Kleiman, 1992). The 
same pattern occurs with the therapeutic 
use of new prescription 
neuropharmaceuticals, as was evident 
during the rapid expansion of antidepressant 
use in many developed societies during the 
1990s; we will probably see a decline in their 
use as soon as the professional and 
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popular media pick up on their adverse 
effects (Healy, 2004). We can expect the 
same phenomena to affect the societal 
embrace of newly emerging 
neuropharmaceuticals when used for 
enhancement. Fourth, the moderate use of 
some drugs may be beneficial. For instance, 
alcohol causes harm when used in 
intoxicating doses but in small quantities can 
prolong life and improve the mental and 
physical health of middle-aged adults in 
developed societies (Babor et al, 2003). The 
moderate short-term use of enhancement 
technologies for specific purposes may 
similarly benefit individuals and possibly 
society. The challenge will be to maximize 
the benefits while minimizing the harms, by 
developing social rules and norms to 
regulate their use (Kleiman, 1992). 
 
In addition, there is the option of laws and 
other regulations to restrict the use of 
neuroenhancements so as to avoid negative 
effects. Again, the history of illicit drug use 
can serve as a guide here. Our experience 
with the regulation of addictive psychoactive 
substances suggests that prohibition will 
certainly reduce but will not eliminate the 
abuse of enhancement technologies, while 
also producing some predictable side 
effects. One is the creation of a black market 
if there is an unmet demand from a 
substantial subset of the population who 
reject the rationale for a ban (Melman, 
2003)—as is the case, for example, for 
cannabis (Hall & Pacula, 2003). In addition, 
history shows time and again that criminals 
are the most likely to benefit from any 
outright prohibition (Melman, 2003). Another 
side effect is the inevitable delay in 
recognizing the harms caused by 
enhancements and in developing social 
norms that safely regulate their use (Stock, 
2002). It should be noted that prohibition is a 
maximally coercive and paternalistic policy 
that should require strong justification in free 
societies with a preference for minimally 
regulated markets in most areas of 
commerce (Stock, 2002). However, 
exceptions have been made for newer 
commodities that affect human mental 
function such as, most recently, MDMA and 
other so-called ‘designer drugs’. 
Conservative politicians thereby often 
combine an enthusiasm for free markets in 
most goods and services— including those 
traditionally provided by the state—with the 
use of criminal laws and draconian penalties 
to prevent the use of newer psychoactive 
drugs, while opposing restrictions on alcohol 
and tobacco as unreasonable incursions by 
the ‘nanny state’. 
 
Some advocates of enhancement therefore 
argue that a free market is best suited to 
deal with any problems that may be caused 
by the use of enhancement technologies 
(Stock, 2002). Bans and regulations, as they 
view it, will not stop the development of 
these technologies. Enhancements are 
marketable by-products of cutting-edge 
research and they will inevitably be 
developed in other societies that do not 
share the same ethical views as the USA 
and Europe. Prohibition only exacerbates 
the problems of access and safety and 
ensures unequal access to these 
technologies because the rich will be most 
able to evade bans by purchasing products 
elsewhere. 
 
Experience with psychoactive drugs shows 
that we need not make a regulatory choice 
between outright prohibition and a free 
market (Kleiman, 1992). Nicotine and 
alcohol demonstrate that a heavily regulated 
market can enable use while reducing harm 
by the imposition of government taxes that 
raise prices and thus discourage use. The 
revenue generated by such taxes can then 
be used to fund interventions that reduce 
harm (Babor et al, 2003). Restrictions on 
sales and access by minors—if enforced—
can also help to reduce abuse, as would 
regulations that restrict the use of 
enhancement technologies in circumstances 
that might endanger third parties, for 
instance by prohibiting driving, work or 
school while under the influence of drugs 
that affect mental function (World Health 
Organization, 1998). Another option that has 
already been mentioned is to regulate 
neuropharmaceuticals similarly to 
pharmaceuticals, by requiring preclinical 
studies, randomized controlled trials and 
post-market surveillance to assess their 
safety and efficacy and to protect 
consumers against doubtful claims (Farah et 
al, 2004). This could be accompanied by a 
system that licenses the providers of 
enhancement products (Melman, 2003). The 
medical profession would be the 
gatekeepers and would be involved in 
assessing the safety and efficacy of 
enhancements. A challenge for this proposal 
will be to ensure the independence and 
credibility of the regulators and medical 
profession to prevent financial ties with the 
emerging enhancement industry that 
undermine independence. Some have 
argued that this has occurred in the case of 
the pharmaceutical industry and 
psychiatrists involved in treating depression 
(Healy, 2004). 
What is clear is that neurological 
enhancements will be with us whether we 
like it or not. The potential market is too 
large to be ignored by pharmaceutical 
companies and even if many people reject 
them initially, there are many others who are 
eager to boost their mental performance. 
We therefore have to come up with sensible 
policies and regulations to ensure the widest 
benefit before neuropharmaceuticals find 
their way into a largely unregulated free 
market or a black market. Our experience 
with other psychoactive drugs has shown 
that a strictly prohibitive stance makes little 
sense as people will nevertheless get 
access to such drugs and treatments. What 
is needed, first and foremost, is a sensible 
and open debate on the potential benefits 
and harms of neuroenhancement. This 
could lead to regulatory policies that would 
ensure their access to those who are 
interested and would help to prevent, or at 
least ease, some of the inevitable negative 
side effects that come with any new 
technology. 
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